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WHERE DO WE DRAW THE LINE? PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING AND THE STATE OF TEXAS

"Bearin mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be
reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which
equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression."
-Thomas Jefferson'
"The citizen can bring our political and governmental institutions back to life, make them responsive and accountable, and
keep them honest. No one else can."
2
-John Gardner
I. INTRODUCTION

Gerrymandering has been around since the term was first
coined in 1812 when Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry
created a "salamander-like" district to benefit his party, the AntiFederalists.3 The term gerrymandering is defined as "[tihe practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often
of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition's voting strength."4 During
most of the two-hundred-year history of gerrymandering, federal
courts steadfastly refused to police partisan gerrymandering because drawing electoral districts was considered the province of
1. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural, 1801, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 318 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).
2. Chellie Pingree, Archibald Cox's Legacy Must Not Vanish, Common Cause: Holding Power Accountable, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNKlMQIwG&B=
223171 (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). John Gardner is the founder of Common Cause and
the former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under President Lyndon B. Johnson.
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708-09 (8th ed. 2004); Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering,83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785 (2005).

4.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 708.
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the legislative branch under the United States Constitution and,
therefore, beyond the reach of the federal courts.5 Finally, in
1986, the Supreme Court of the United States entered the arena
in Davis v. Bandemer,6 holding that political gerrymandering
claims are justiciable.7 Since that decision, the Supreme Court
and the federal courts have grappled with finding a judicially
manageable standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claims.8 In 2004, the Supreme Court revisited partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer9 but could not agree on whether a
judicially manageable standard exists to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering or whether the courts should even adjudicate partisan gerrymandering. ° Although federal courts still entertain partisan gerrymandering claims, no workable judicial standard
exists to adjudicate them, complicating successful gerrymandering suits.

5. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (holding that Congress has
the "exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House"
and that it was "left to that House [to determine] whether States have fulfilled their responsibility"); see also Berman, supra note 3, at 785. Nonetheless, remedies were still
available in state courts under state constitutional rights, which tended to provide more
specific protections to citizens. See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating
PartisanGerrymanderingClaims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 645 (2004).
6. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
7. See id. at 123. The Supreme Court, however, did not provide a standard by which
these claims could be adjudicated. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-72 (2004) (plurality opinion).
8. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 n.6 (citing Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, 332 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 2003)); Smith v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1998); La
Porte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of La Porte, 43 F.3d 1126 (7th
Cir. 1994); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Martinez v.
Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (per curiam); O'Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d
850 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (per curiam), affd, 537 U.S. 997 (2002); Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1994) (per curiam); Terrazas v.
Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Holloway v. Hechler, 817 F.
Supp. 617 (S.D. W. Va. 1992), affd, 507 U.S. 956 (1993); Fund for Accurate & Informed
Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. Supp. 662 (N.D.N.Y.) (per curiam), affd, 506 U.S.
1017 (1992); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 506 U.S. 801 (1992); Ill. Legislative Redistricting Comm'n v. LaPaille, 782 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp.
394 (D. Md. 1991), per curiam, affd, 504 U.S. 938 (1992); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections,
777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Republican Party of Va. v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400
(W.D. Va. 1991); Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 1024
(1989); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1987); In re 2003 Legislative Apportionment of the House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810 (Me. 2003); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646 (Md. 1993); McClure v. Se. of the Commonwealth,
766 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 2002).
9. 541 U.S. at 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
10. See id. at 305.
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The Supreme Court, in December 2005, decided to hear four of
the eight cases revolving around the 2003 Texas congressional
district map, providing the Court with another opportunity to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering. 1' Two of the cases ("Texas Redistricting Cases") raise the issues of partisan gerrymandering,
one-person, one-vote, and the constitutionality of mid-decade redistricting.1 2 The Texas Redistricting Cases will do little to resolve the conflict of Bandemer and Vieth, but they will provide an
opportunity for the Court to define "severe partisan gerrymandering" and limit how partisan a legislature can be.
This comment examines the Supreme Court's treatment of partisan gerrymandering in the past and the important aspects of
the Texas Redistricting Cases that distinguishes them from other
political gerrymandering cases previously before the Court. Part
II provides an overview of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
malapportionment and partisan gerrymandering, specifically emphasizing the twenty years of confusion created by the Court's decisions in Bandemer and Vieth. The Supreme Court entered the
congressional and state districting arena just over fifty years ago,
first adjudicating malapportionment and then partisan gerrymandering. The Court has struggled in determining whether
courts should entertain claims of partisan gerrymandering and
how they should adjudicate these claims. Part III examines the
redistricting situation in Texas as seen in the Texas legislature
and the district courts, and highlights important differences between the Texas cases and prior partisan gerrymandering claims
that have appeared before the Supreme Court. Finally, Part IV
analyzes two partisan gerrymandering arguments presented by
the appellants in the Texas Redistricting Cases and the various
policy concerns. The appellants argue (1) that mid-decade redistricting for partisan gain constitutes impermissible partisan gerrymandering, and (2) the use of outdated census figures violates

11. See State Appellees' Brief at 17, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, No.
05-204 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter State Appellees' Briefi. The four cases were consolidated for argument. See id. The state of Texas filed one appellees' brief. All four appellants filed briefs, which are cited throughout this comment.
12. The two Texas cases focusing on racial gerrymandering and the rights of Latino
and African-American voters are beyond the scope of this comment. This comment focuses
on the partisan gerrymandering arguments presented in Brief for Appellants, Jackson v.
Perry, No. 05-276 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Brief for Jackson Appellants] and Brief
for Appellants, Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, No. 05-254 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Brief for Travis County Appellants].
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the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Constitution. A Supreme Court ruling on partisan gerrymandering, either for the
appellants or for the State of Texas, will determine the future of
partisan gerrymandering litigation. If the Court upholds the district court's rulings and legitimizes the actions of the Texas legislature, then the Court essentially will leave the policing of partisan gerrymandering to state legislatures and the electorate. If the
Court holds the 2003 Texas congressional map unconstitutional
as a partisan gerrymander, then the federal courts will continue
their struggle to police the politics of state legislatures in the districting process.
II. THE HISTORY OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
A. From Malapportionmentto PartisanGerrymandering
For over 174 years the Supreme Court tenaciously refused to
adjudicate districting cases involving political gerrymandering
and malapportionment. 13 This refusal culminated in 1946 in its
decision in Colegrove v. Green,'4 a malapportionment case. The
Colegrove plaintiffs sought an injunction against holding congressional elections under an outdated Illinois districting scheme that
had not been modified since 1901, thus resulting in immense
population inequalities between the districts. 5 Writing for a divided Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter rejected the appellant's
argument for judicial intervention because Article I, Section 4 of
the Constitution' 6 entrusted apportionment matters entirely to
Congress.' 7 "To sustain this action would cut very deep into the

13. Malapportionment is a cousin of gerrymandering and "involves the creation and
preservation of electoral districts of different population sizes, so that the ratio of representatives to voters varies across districts." Berman, supra note 3, at 785 n.20. Gerrymandering deals with districts of roughly equal population sizes. See id.
14. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (plurality opinion).
15. See id. at 550-51 (plurality opinion).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for ... Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations....").
17. See Colegrove, 728 U.S. at 552-54 (plurality opinion). Two other Justices joined
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court, see id. at 550 (plurality opinion), and Justice
Rutledge concurred only in the result, see id. at 564 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justices
Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented on Equal Protection grounds. See id. at 566-74
(Black, J., dissenting).
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very being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket," wrote Justice Frankfurter."8 "The remedy for unfairness
in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion
"
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress. "
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court reversed course and, in
Baker v. Carr,20 held that malapportionment claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.2 ' Justice William Brennan
used six indicators to determine whether a claim fell within the
political question doctrine and, therefore, could not be adjudicated by the federal courts:
[1] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or [21 a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
22
one question.
pronouncements by various departments on

The presence of any one of these factors would render a case
nonjusticiable. Justice Brennan argued that none of these factors
were present in the claim before the Court and, therefore, the
federal courts were not prevented from adjudicating malapportionment claims.2" Unfortunately, the Court did not provide any
guidance or standard for adjudicating malapportionment claims
and offered no insight into the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims.24

18. Id. at 556 (plurality opinion).
19. Id. (plurality opinion).
20.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

21. See id. at 237. "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." Id. at 226.
22. Id. at 217.
23. See id. at 226.
24. Justice Clark concurred with the majority but sharply criticized the Court for failing to provide detailed standards for malapportionment claims. See id. at 251 (Clark, J.,
concurring). Justices Harlan and Frankfurter fervently dissented. Justice Frankfurter
warned the Court that their
[d]isregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's "judicial
Power" not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially
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A trio of cases, Gray v. Sanders,2 5 Wesberry v. Sanders,26 and
Reynolds v. Sims,2 7 decided in 1963 and 1964, established the
crucial one-person, one-vote rule in malapportionment cases dealing with both state and congressional districts.28 The Court found
the constitutional basis for the one-person, one-vote rule in both
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment29 and
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution." Chief Justice Earl Warren clearly articulated this rule in Reynolds, writing that "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the
State."3 The Court first acknowledged the problem of partisan
gerrymandering in Reynolds but did not determine the justiciability of a partisan gerrymandering claim because that was not an
issue presented before the Court.3 2 Chief Justice Warren explained that "some distinctions may well be made between congressional and state legislative representation .... [because] [iundiscriminate districting, without any regard for political

political conflict of forces ... [but] may well impair the Court's position as the
ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal
problems.
See id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also criticized the majority, saying that unless the state legislature had acted wholly irrationally, the Court had no room
to adjudicate. See id. at 334 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
26. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
27. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
28. State districting maps were not being updated on a regular basis, resulting in districts suffering from population inequalities between rural and urban areas. See Michael
W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 104-05 (2000). Districts in cities had significantly higher
populations than districts in rural areas, diluting the weight of the votes in those districts.
See id.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States. . . .") (emphasis
added). The Gray Court held that a state violated equal protection by weighing some votes
more than others after setting voter eligibility requirements for electing statewide officers.
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 379-81. Wesberry dealt with congressional districts and the Court
based its rule of one-person, one-vote in Article I, Section 2 instead of the Equal Protection
Clause. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8. Reynolds dealt with state legislative districts and
the Equal Protection Clause, but the Court also applied the Wesberry rule, that a state
must "make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
31. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
32. Reynolds dealt with malapportionment, and partisan gerrymandering was not one
of the complaints alleged in the suit. See id. at 536-37.
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subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little
more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering."3 3 Ten
years later in Karcher v. Daggett,34 another malapportionment
case, Justice John Paul Stevens, argued in his concurring opinion, that the Equal Protection Clause also protects against partisan gerrymandering."
When a State adopts rules governing its election machinery or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the
entire community. If they serve no purpose other than to favor one
segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic or politicalthat may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time,
or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community,
36
equal protection.
they violate the constitutional guarantee of

Justice Lewis Powell, in his dissent, also tackled the issue of
gerrymandering and agreed that based upon the facts in Karcher,
"one cannot rationally believe that the New Jersey Legislature
considered factors other than the most partisan political goals
and population equality" and that the plan violated equal protection.3 ' Because the district court only considered the constitutionality of the population deviations and did not adjudicate the gerrymandering issue, Justice Powell reasoned that the gerry38
mandering was not at issue for the Court.
B. The Justiciabilityof PartisanGerrymandering
1. Partisan Gerrymandering is Justiciable
It was not until Davis v. Bandemer,3 9 sixteen years after Baker
decided the justiciability of malapportionment, that the Court, in
a six-to-three vote, declared that partisan gerrymandering was a

33. Id. at 578-79.
34. 462 U.S. 725 (1983). In Karcher, plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey congressional
apportionment plan arguing that it allegedly diluted the voting strength of Republicans.
See id. at 729. The Court invalidated the scheme because the population deviations between the congressional districts failed to reflect a good-faith effort to achieve population
equality after analyzing the case under Article I, Section 2 and prior case law but did not
broach the issue of gerrymandering in its decision. See id. at 730-31, 744.
35. See id. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
37. See id. at 788-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 790 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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justiciable issue. 40 Indiana Democrats challenged the redistricting
scheme adopted by the Republican-controlled state legislature,
claiming that the scheme diluted the votes of that state's Democrats and violated their equal protection rights.4 1 Six Justices
agreed that partisan gerrymandering was a justiciable issue
without deciding upon a standard for adjudicating those claims,
reasoning that when Baker decided that malapportionment was a
justiciable issue, the Baker Court "did not rely on the potential for
such a rule in finding justiciability."4 2
The test the four-member plurality of the Bandemer Court set
forth required proof of "both intentional discrimination against an
identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group" for the partisan gerrymandering suit to be successful.43 The first prong of this test, intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group, would not be difficult for
plaintiffs to meet, the Court reasoned, so long as the redistricting
plan had been done by the state legislature. 44 To measure the second prong, the requisite discriminatory effect, there would need
to be proof that the particular political group had "been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political
process. '4' This high threshold would be satisfied "by evidence of
continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence
the political process."4 6
Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, rejected this test and argued that "district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When
deciding where those lines will fall, the State should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political
beliefs or party affiliation."47 The test proposed by Justice Powell

40. See id. at 113 (plurality opinion).
41. See id. at 115 (plurality opinion).
42. Id. at 123 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion). While a majority could not agree to a specific test for
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, the four Justice plurality agreed to the test
set forth by Justice Powell that has been the test used by the lower federal courts. See
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).
44. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 132-33 (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 133 (plurality opinion). Plaintiffs have yet to succeed under this test. See
supra note 8.
47. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to determine whether a legislature resorted to unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering focused on three factors: "[1] the shapes
of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries.... [21 the nature of the legislative procedures by
which the apportionment law was adopted and [3] legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals."4" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justice William Rehnquist, argued that partisan gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable because of the federal courts' inability to
find or create a judicially manageable standard:4 9
[Tihe Court's holding that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable has opened the door to pervasive and unwarranted judicial
superintendence of the legislative task of apportionment. There is
simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a
requirement of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group.
. . . The Equal Protection Clause does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering
was
claims, and no group right to an equal share of political power
50
Amendment.
ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth

The Bandemer decision confused federal courts by failing to set
forth a clear standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claims, leaving the federal courts to rely upon the plurality's impossible test. The twenty partisan gerrymandering cases that followed Bandemer resulted in the federal courts denying relief in
each and every one,5 ' leaving commentators to conclude that its
"standards are fundamentally unworkable and incorporate such
ambiguous and unclear commands as to be unfit for any manageable form of judicial application."5 2

Justice Powell's argument revives the reasoning of Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Karcher v. Daggett. See 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. See id. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. See supra note 8.
52. Samuel Issacharoff, JudgingPolitics: The Elusive Quest for JudicialReview of Political Fairness,71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (1993); see also John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 621 (1997) (observing that "by its
impossibly high proof requirements the Court in Bandemer essentially eliminated political
gerrymandering as a meaningful cause of action").
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2. No Standard Exists for the Courts to Adjudicate Partisan
Gerrymandering
After eighteen years, the Supreme Court returned to confront
partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer13 The 2000 Census
reduced the number of congressional seats in Pennsylvania from
twenty-one to nineteen and the state legislature assumed the
task of drawing a new districting map.5 4 The Republican Party
controlled a majority of both state houses and the Governor's office and adopted a partisan redistricting map, known as Act 1,
designed to punish Democrats for enacting pro-Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere. 5 The plan was designed to give Republicans at least thirteen congressional seats, even though the political parties shared almost equal support among the Pennsylvania
electorate.56
Registered Democrats in Pennsylvania brought suit against
Act 1, seeking to enjoin its implementation and alleging "malapportioned districts, in violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement of Article I, [Section] 2 of the United States Constitution, and that it constituted a political gerrymander, in violation
of Article I and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."5 7 The complaint alleged that districts were drawn
in a "meandering and irregular" way and that "all traditional redistricting criteria, including the preservation of local government boundaries," had been ignored for the purpose of partisan
advantage. The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss all the claims against Pennsylvania except the apportionment claim,59 over which the court retained jurisdiction to review and approve the remedial plan, enacted on April 18, 2002,
known as Act 34.60 The plaintiffs moved to impose the remedial
districts, arguing that Act 34 should not be considered a proper
remedial scheme because it was malapportioned and constituted
an unconstitutional political gerrymander for the same reasons as

53. 541 U.S. 267 (plurality opinion).
54. See id. at 272 (plurality opinion).
55. See id. (plurality opinion).
56. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
57. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 272-73 (plurality opinion).
59. See id. at 273 (plurality opinion).
60. See id. (plurality opinion).
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Act 1.61 The district court denied the motion and concluded that
the new districts were not malapportioned and did not constitute
a partisan gerrymander.62 The court reasoned that Act 1 simply
made it more difficult for the plaintiffs to elect Democratic
candi63
prevail:
to
enough
not
was
alone
that
and
dates,
[Tihe mere fact that a particular appointment scheme makes it more
difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally
infirm .... [A] group's electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes
winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute
impermissible discrimination un64
der the Equal Protection Clause.

The Supreme Court heard the case on December 10, 2003, and in
a four-four-one vote, upheld the ruling of the district court.65
The Supreme Court, as it did in Bandemer, disagreed on how
partisan gerrymandering claims should be adjudicated in Vieth.
The plurality, written by Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Clarence
Thomas, held that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.66 Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed that no justiciable
standard existed and affirmed the district court's opinion joined
in dismissing the claim but would not go so far as to say all partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.67 Justices Stephen
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, David Souter (joined by Ruth
Bader Ginsberg), and John Paul Stevens dissented from the plurality, with each dissent proposing a new test for federal courts to
adjudicate partisan gerrymandering.68
The plurality opinion recognized that even though the judiciary
is responsible for declaring what the law is, there are cases in
which the judiciary "has no business entertaining the claim of
unlawfulness-because the question is entrusted to one of the po-

61. Id. (plurality opinion).
62. See id. (plurality opinion).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
Id. at 546-47 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131-32 (1986)).
See Veith, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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69
litical branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights."
Looking back to the six independent tests of Baker v. Carr, Justice Scalia concluded that partisan gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable because they lack judicially discoverable and manageable standards, one of the factors listed in Baker.70 Reasoning
that because the federal courts had failed to succeed in shaping
the standard from Bandemer and because the four dissenters
enunciated three different standards, each one different from the
two standards proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed by the
appellants, Justice Scalia concluded that "there is no constitutionally discernable standard" for partisan gerrymandering
cases.71

In examining the six tests put forth to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice Scalia began with the test proposed
by the plurality in Bandemer because it had been the standard
used by the federal courts." Justice Scalia rejected this test because it "was misguided when proposed, has not been improved in
subsequent application, and is not even defended ... by the appellants."7 3 The appellants proposed a test similar to Bandemer
but modified the level of intent to predominant intent." Under
this test, "a plaintiff must 'show that the mapmakers acted with a
predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage,' [supported]
'by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that other neutral and legitimate redistricting criteria were subordinated to the
goal of achieving partisan advantage.' 7 5 Justice Scalia discarded
this test because the second part of the test would require that a
redistricting plan be invalidated only if a majority of the electorate is prevented from electing a majority of the representatives,
and this is constitutionally unjustifiable because there is no constitutional requirement of proportional representation. 76 The appellants' test employed the reasoning used in racial gerrymandering cases that applied section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,"

69. Id. at 277 (plurality opinion).
70. See id. at 277-81 (plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 292 (plurality opinion).
72. See id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 283-84 (plurality opinion).
74. See id. at 284 (plurality opinion).
75. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 19, Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (No.
02-1580)).
76. See id. at 287-88 (plurality opinion).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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and Justice Scalia argued that because "a person's politics is
rarely as readily discernible-and never as permanently discernable-as a person's race,""8 it is impossible to ascertain which
party holds the majority in a state.7 9 Justice Scalia discarded the
three-factor test proposed by Justice Powell in Bandemer ° because it rests upon the idea of fairness, and '[flairness' does not
seem to us a judicially manageable standard."'"
The plurality then examined the tests proposed by the dissenters, Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer. Justice Stevens argued
that political affiliations are an inappropriate factor to consider
when constructing district lines, 2 and that by looking at the appearance of the districts and procedures used to create them,
courts can effectively identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering." Applying the analysis of racial gerrymandering,
Justice Stevens proposed to examine whether partisan considerations dominate over neutral considerations and control the redistricting scheme.8 4 If there is no identifiable neutral criterion used
that can justify the district lines, and if the only possible explanation for the district's bizarre shape is a desire to increase party
strength, there is a valid partisan gerrymandering claim under
the Equal Protection Clause." Justice Scalia criticized Justice
Stevens's test for the same reasons the appellants' standard
failed to pass muster; the criterion used for racial gerrymandering cases cannot be applied to partisan gerrymandering claims.8 6
Justice Souter proposed a test that would require plaintiffs "to
satisfy elements of a prima facie cause of action, at which point
the State would have the opportunity not only to rebut the evidence supporting plaintiffs case, but to offer an affirmative justification for the districting choices, even assuming the proof of the

78. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287 (plurality opinion).
79. See id. at 286-87 (plurality opinion).
80. The three factors, none of which are dispositive, include (1) the shapes of voting
districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries, (2) the nature of
the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted, and (3) legislative
history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
173 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion).
82. See id. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 321-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 293 (plurality opinion).
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plaintiffs allegations.""7 The plaintiff would have to establish five
required elements: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a "cohesive political
group" such as a major political party; 8 (2) the district in which
the plaintiff resides "paid little or no heed to those traditional districting principles whose disregard can be shown straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions,
and conformity with geographic features;" 9 (3) "specific correlations between the district's deviations from traditional districting
principles and the distribution of the population of [the plaintiffs]
group" are sufficient to support "an inference that the district
took the shape it did because of the distribution of plaintiffs
group;"90 (4) presentation of a hypothetical district that includes
the plaintiffs residence "in which the proportion of the plaintiffs
group was lower (in a packing claim) or higher (in a cracking one)
and which at the same time deviated less from traditional districting principles than the actual district;"9 and (5) evidence
"that the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape
92
of the district in order to pack or crack [the plaintiffs] group."
Justice Scalia criticized this test for two main reasons. First, the
test would fail because it is unclear what constitutional deprivation Justice Souter is attempting to identify and prevent, except
for a vague notion of "extremity of unfairness." 93 The second
shortcoming of this test, according to Justice Scalia, is the
amount of quantifying judgment needed for the last four elements:
How much disregard of traditional districting principles? How many
correlations between deviations and distribution? How much remedying of packing or cracking by the hypothetical district? How many
legislators must have had the intent to pack and crack-and how efficacious must that intent have been (must it have been ... a sine
qua non cause of the districting, or a predominant cause)?94

87. Id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 347-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 349 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 349 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Cracking" and "packing" are two of the most
common tools used by gerrymanderers. See Berman, supra note 3, at 800-01 n.136. In
packing, opposition voters are "packed" into the smallest number of districts where they
already constitute a majority. Id. In cracking, small groups of opposition voters are split
into a large number of districts where they are the minority. Id.
92. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 297 (plurality opinion) ("[N]o element of his test looks to the effect of the
gerrymander on the electoral success, the electoral opportunity, or even the political influence, of the plaintiffs group.").
94. Id. at 296 (plurality opinion).
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Justice Scalia pointed out that while the test proposed by Justice
Souter might be judicially manageable, it fails to relate to any
constitutional harms.9 5
Justice Breyer proposed the sixth and final test and was the
only dissenter in Vieth to agree that the use of political considerations in redistricting is not a fatal flaw but can actually be a
96
valuable tool in situations such as single-member districts. Justice Breyer argued that a system of redistricting that does not
take into account partisan considerations could convert "a small
shift in political sentiment ..9 7 into a seismic shift in the make-up
of the legislative delegation.
[TIraditional or historically based boundaries are not, and should not
be, "politics free." Rather, those boundaries represent a series of
compromises of principle-among the virtues of, for example, close
representation of voter views, ease of identifying "government" and
"opposition" parties, and stability in government. They also repreby tradition, among different parsent an uneasy truce, sanctioned
98
ties seeking political advantage.

Justice Breyer argued that partisan redistricting is unconstitutional when it involves "unjustified entrenchment." 99 He defined
entrenchment as a situation in which "a party that enjoys only
minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived
to take, and hold, legislative power" and unjustified entrenchment as a situation in which "the minority's hold on power is
purely the result of partisan manipulation and not other factors."' 0 While Justice Breyer failed to give specific examples of
unjustified entrenchment, he did illustrate the concept with several sets of circumstances; in each, he evaluated four factors, including (1) when the districts were redrawn, (2) how the districts
compare to traditional districting criteria, (3) how the majority
party fares in the recent elections, and (4) possible explanations
for election results other than efforts to obtain partisan political
advantage. 1 1 The plurality approved of Justice Breyer's acknowledgement that the pursuit of partisan advantage can be constitu-

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 294-95 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 357-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 365-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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tional, but they criticized his concept of unjustified entrenchment
10 2
as a standard because of the uncertainty in its application.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, agreed with both
the plurality and the dissenters. He concurred with the plurality
in their assertion that a judicially manageable standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims has yet to be presented,
but he refrained from going so far as to say that partisan gerrymandering claims are categorically nonjusticiable.' ° ' Two main
obstacles exist when courts are presented with partisan gerrymandering claims according to Justice Kennedy. "First is the lack
of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral
boundaries."10'4 He argued that the conclusion that partisan gerrymandering violates the law must be "more than the conclusion
that political classifications were applied," it must be "that the
classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in an
invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective."'0' Second, there is an "absence of rules to limit and
confine judicial intervention."1 06 Justice Kennedy argued that before we can define a clear and manageable standard, there must
be an agreement on the substantive principles of districting's
fairness. 10 7 Rather than reach the conclusion of the plurality, that
no judicially manageable standard has yet to emerge and, therefore, partisan gerrymandering claims should be outside the province of the judiciary, Justice Kennedy would have dismissed the
case for failure to state a claim and would have held out hope for
crafting a workable standard.' 8
Vieth accomplished very little in the wake of Bandemer. The
Court did set aside Bandemer because of its vague ruling and the
difficulty in applying the high standard set by the Bandemer
Court, but it did very little to resolve the justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering claims. The plurality opinion held that partisan
gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable; however, the lack of a
clear consensus by the Court and the arrival of two new Justices,

102.
Justice
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 299-300 (plurality opinion) ("In sum, we neither know precisely what
Breyer is testing for, nor precisely what fails the test.").
See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito,' °9 leaves
open the possibility that future partisan gerrymandering claims
may succeed in the judicial system.
III. THE SITUATION IN TEXAS
A. The PoliticalHistory of Texas
"ITihe Democratic Party dominated the political landscape in
Texas" from Reconstruction until the early 1960s.110 In 1961, the
first Republican since 1875 was elected to the Senate; in the
1960s and 1970s, the Republican Party never held more than four
congressional seats, and their statewide voting strength hovered
around thirty-five percent. 1 ' In 1978, even though the Republican Party reclaimed the Governor's Mansion for the first time in
over one hundred years and had statewide voting strength at
forty-three percent, Democrats won twenty of the twenty-four
congressional seats. 1 2 In the 1980s, the Republican Party's
strength grew, and by 1990 the Republican Party's statewide voting strength sat at forty-seven percent, merely four points lower
than the Democratic Party's statewide voting strength."' The
Democrats, however, still controlled nineteen congressional districts, compared to the Republicans' eight districts." 4
In 1991, the Democratically controlled Texas legislature enacted a new congressional district map resulting in the Democratic Party winning twenty-one congressional seats to the Republican Party's nine. 1 The Republicans continued to gain control
over the statewide races, with their statewide voting strength
even with that of the Democratic Party."6 Several Republicans
109. Chief Justice John Roberts was confirmed on September 29, 2005. Charles
Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
2005, at Al. Justice Samuel Alito was confirmed on January 31, 2006. Charles Babington,
Alito Is Sworn in on High Court,WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at Al.
110. Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763 (E.D. Tex. 2005); cf Mike Kingston,
John Tower: The GOP's Godfather, in 1992-93 TEXAS ALMANAC AND STATE INDUSTRIAL
GUIDE 438, 438 (1991).
111. See Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
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challenged the 1991 congressional district map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under Bandemer, but the district
court denied relief and upheld the 1991 map.'1 7 In the 1992 elections, the Democratic Party won twenty-one congressional seats,
and the Republican Party won nine.18 In the 1990s, the Republicans continued to dominate the statewide elections and won every
one of Texas's elected statewide offices since 1994."19 In 1997, the
Republican Party took control of the Texas Senate, but it would
be another six years before the Republican Party
controlled both
20
mansion.
Governor's
the
and
state legislatures
B. The 2001 CongressionalDistrictingProcess
After the 2000 federal decennial census, Texas received two
additional seats in Congress, giving the state a total of thirtytwo. 2' The Texas legislature, in 2001, received the task of replacing the previous thirty districts with thirty-two new, equipopulous districts. 2 2 At that time, Democrats and Republicans shared
political power in Texas, with "Republicans controlling the State
Senate and the Governor's mansion and Democrats controlling
the State House." 23 The Texas legislature failed to agree to a new
congressional districting map, and Governor Rick Perry refused
to call a special session to resolve the issue, so the burden shifted
to a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas to create a new congressional districting
map. 124 On November 14, 2001, in Balderas v. Texas,1 25 the district court unanimously imposed a new thirty-two
district con26
gressional map upon Texas, named Plan 1151C.1

117. See Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 844 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
118. See State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 2.
119. See id. at 4.
120. See id. at 5.
121. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 3.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 3-4.
125. Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 2001) (per curiam).
126. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 4.
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2001 Texas Congressional District Map-Plan 1151C

The Balderas court realized that federal courts have a limited
role in creating a congressional redistricting and that "'a court
must defer to legislative judgments on reapportionment as much
as possible;"'128 however, in the given situation, the court 'is forbidden to [defer] when the legislative plan would not meet the
special standards of population equality and racial fairness that
are applicable to court-ordered plans."'129 In drawing the map, the
district court started with a blank map and applied "'neutral districting factors' that include compactness, contiguity, and respect
for county and municipal boundaries. 3 ° Following the process of
127. Jurisdictional Statement app. at 218a, Jackson v. Perry, No. 05-276 (U.S. Aug. 31,
2005) [hereinafter Jackson Jurisdictional Statement].
128. Balderas, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740, at *11 (quoting Upham v. Seamon, 456
U.S. 37, 39 (1982) (per curiam)).
129. Id. (quoting Upham, 456 U.S. at 39).
130. See id. at *11, *13.
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neutral redistricting outlined by Dr. John Alford, Rice University
professor of political science, 3 1 the court "checked [its] plan
against the test ... of each party based on prior election results
against the percentage breakdown statewide of votes cast for each
party in congressional races" 132 and found that the plan was
"likely to produce a congressional delegation roughly proportional
to the party voting breakdown across the state." 3 3 The new congressional district map went into effect November 14, 2001, and
neither the State nor any other defendant appealed the district
court's decision. 34
The court-drawn plan was utilized in the 2002 congressional
elections in Texas and resulted in a congressional delegation with
fifteen Republicans and seventeen Democrats.' 3 5 The two new districts elected Republicans, twenty-eight other districts reelected
incumbents, and one new freshman from each party was
elected.' 3 6 In the Texas state races, the Republicans took control
37
of the state legislature for the first time in decades.'
C. The 2003 RedistrictingProcess
In 2003, the newly elected seventy-eighth legislature of Texas
convened and decided to voluntarily reconsider redistricting the
congressional districts. 13 This unprecedented act of reconsidering
the congressional districts in the middle of the decade ignited a
controversy in the Texas legislature. The critical deadline for
passing the legislation for a new congressional district plan in the
regular session lapsed when a group of Democratic state repre131.

John R. Alford served as the State's expert witness in the Balderas trial. See id. at

*12.
132. Id. at *17-18.
133. Id. at *18.
134. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 4-5. Several Latino plaintiffs,
however, appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that an additional Hispanic district
should be drawn in the Southwest region of the state. Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158,
2001 WL 34104836 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2001) (per curiam), affd., 536 U.S. 919 (2002). The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court and upheld the 2001 congressional district map. Balderas v. Texas, 536 U.S. 919 (2002).
135. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 5. Representative Ralph Hall,
however, switched parties in January 2004, resulting in sixteen Democrat and sixteen Republican Representatives. See Jackson Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 127, at 5 n.1.
136. See Jackson Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 127, at 5.
137. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 6.
138. See id.
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sentatives left the state and broke quorum for a week and quashed any hope of passing a new district scheme. 139 Governor Rick
Perry called the Texas legislature into special session in order to
resume the congressional redistricting. 4 ' The first two special
sessions failed to pass a new district scheme because eleven members of the Texas Senate steadfastly refused to pass any new
plan."' The long-standing tradition of the Texas Senate required
support from a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate Jurisprudence Committee (comprised of thirty-one members) before the
full Senate would consider the measure. 4 2 Because the eleven
Senators refused to approve the plan, Lieutenant Governor David
Dewhurst announced plans to abandon the two-thirds rule in any
future special session.'4 3 The eleven Texas Senators then fled the
state to deprive the Senate of a quorum.'4 4 When one state senator returned to the state a month later, the third special session
was called into action.14
In the third special session, each house passed a map preserving all eleven minority districts. The conferees, however, produced a new map that dismantled two minority districts, District
24 in the Dallas-Fort Worth area and District 23 in south Texas,
and added another minority district that stretched three hundred
miles from McAllen to Austin.'4 6 This new map, known as Plan
1374C, passed both state Senate and House on October 10 and
12, 2002, with every Latino and African-American State Senator
the minority State Representatives voting
and all but two of147
1374C.
Plan
against

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Jackson Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 127, at 7.
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2003 Texas Congressional District Map-Plan 1374C 4 '
The new map shifted over eight million Texans into new districts and split up more counties than the prior, valid 2001 map;
and the new thirty-two districts were less compact than before. 149
The 2003 plan endeavored "to protect all [fifteen] Republican
Members of Congress and to defeat at least [seven] of the [seventeen] Democratic Members."' ° Six of the Democrats were "paired"
with another incumbent, placed in Republican-heavy districts, or
placed in completely new districts where they were unknown to
constituents.15 1 The seventh Democrat was the representative of
District 24-a district dominated by minority populations-where
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id., app. at 219a.
See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 8.
Id.
See id.
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the constituents were split up and placed into five different, pre2
dominantly non-Latino, white districts." The Republican incumbent, Representative Henry Bonilla in District 23, narrowly won
the 2002 election, and the new 2003 map ensured his safety in being re-elected by moving 100,000 Latino voters and replacing
53
them with non-Latino, white and Republican voters.' To change
the voter make-up of District 23, the legislature drew a new district that stretched from the Mexican border to Austin, called District 25. T5 Stretching three hundred miles long, it joined two
densely populated areas, one in Austin and one in the Rio Grande
Valley, by a narrow stretch of land that is only ten miles wide in
some areas. 155 The new map was predicted to give Republicans at
least twenty-one solid congressional districts out of thirty-two
districts, and that prediction came true in the 2004 elections
seats with very few close comwhen Republicans won twenty-one
156
districts.
the
in
petitions

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id.

8-9.
9.
9-10.
10.
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Jackson Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 127, app. at 221a.
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D. The ProceduralHistory
Plan 1374C was challenged by Texas voters of various races
and ethnicities in over seventeen congressional districts. They alleged that the new plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander-a violation of both the racial gerrymandering doctrine of
59
Shaw v. Reno15 and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' The district court upheld the 2003 map, and the Supreme Court denied a
stay 6 ° but later vacated the district court's ruling and remanded
the case back to the district court to consider in light of the
court
Court's ruling in Vieth. 6 ' Following the remand, the16district
plan. 2
2003
the
upheld
again
and
arguments
reheard
In the cases before the remand to the district court, the State of
Texas admitted, and the three-judge court found as fact, that the
sole motivation for changing the court-drawn map in 2003 was to
increase the number of seats held by Republicans and diminish
6' 3
the number of seats held by Democrats. On remand, the district
court did not retract its previous finding of partisan motivation
but instead concluded that it is a constitutionally permissible exercise of government power to create a redistricting map that appeals solely to partisan motivations."M The Supreme Court, on
December 13, 2005, granted certiorari to hear four of the Texas
Redistricting Cases. 6 5

158. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
159. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 10-11.
160. See Jackson v. Perry, 540 U.S. 1147 (2004).
161. Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
162. See Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 778 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
163. See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470-71 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
"There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in
enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage." Id. at 470. "'[T]he newly dominant
Republicans ... decided to redraw the state's congressional districts solely for the purpose
of seizing between five and seven seats from Democratic incumbents.'" Id. at 472 (citation
omitted). "Former Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff, one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate and commonly referred to as the conscience of the Senate, testified that
political gain for the Republicans was 110% of the motivation for the Plan, that it was 'the
entire motivation.'" Id. at 472-73. But see State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 28-29
(arguing that while partisan gain was a motivating factor, it was only one of many factors
influencing the 2002 redistricting process).
164. Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 765-67.
165. The court noted probable jurisdiction in the following cases: GI Forum of Tex. v.
Perry, 126 S. Ct. 829 (2005); Jackson v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005); League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct.
827 (2005). The Supreme Court set aside two hours of oral arguments to be heard on Mar.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS
The Texas Redistricting Cases introduce several new issues not
previously presented to the Court. Unlike Vieth and Bandemer,
the redistricting of Texas took place mid-decade and not as the
result of the decennial census and the constitutional need to reapportion the congressional districts.'66 The State of Texas had a
valid and workable congressional district map in place that would
have sufficed until the next decennial census in 2010; the state
had no constitutional obligation to reapportion their districts in
2003.167 It is also established that the redistricting took place for
no other reason than to secure a greater partisan advantage in
upcoming elections. 6 ' The 2001 congressional district map, however, was created by the federal court'6 9 and not by the state legislature, to whom the Constitution vests the power to determine
district boundaries.17° The inability of the state legislature to alter the judicially created map until 2010 infringes upon that
power. Additionally, none of the appellants propose a new test or
standard for the courts to implement when adjudicating partisan
gerrymandering.' 7 ' Without a way to measure future partisan
gerrymandering, the Court will remain in the quagmire surrounding Bandemer and Vieth. Finally, there is the concern that,
if the Court upholds Plan 1374C, then voters will lose their power
to determine their representatives to political parties.
A. One-Person, One-Vote Requirement of the Constitution
Under the one-person, one-vote rule established by Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution, the Court has consistently held that
congressional districts must have equal populations; otherwise,
they are unconstitutional.'7 2 Realizing that population shifts oc-

1, 2006 based only on the appellants briefs; the state of Texas and the other defendants
did not submit briefs prior to the Supreme Court's decision to review the case.
166. See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 6.
167. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 19.
168. See Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
169. See Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740, at *11 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 14, 2001) (per curiam).
170. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
171. See State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 36-38.
172. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488 n.2 (2003); Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983); Gaffhey v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741 (1973); Reynolds v.
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cur often and are almost impossible to track,'7 3 the Court has established the legal fiction, for apportionment purposes, that populations do not shift between districts between the decennial censuses.'7 4 The Court maintains that once a state has completed a
new district map after the decennial census, that state may "operate under the legal fiction that even [ten] years later, the plans
are constitutionally apportioned."1 7 This legal fiction satisfies the
practical concern that constant redistricting would be an impossible task for the state to manage and simultaneously creates a
workable time frame for the states to readjust their districts.'7 6
The constitutional equal population standard tolerates only
"population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith
1 77
effort to achieve absolute equality."
Between the 2000 census and 2003, the population in Texas increased from 20,851,820 to 22,118,509, an increase of almost 1.5
million.'78 When the Texas legislature enacted Plan 1374C, it
used the outdated census data from 2000 in violation of Karcher
v. Daggett.7 9 The rule in Karcher permits only limited departures
from inequality in congressional redistricting maps and only if
those departures are unavoidable after a good faith effort to
achieve absolute equality. 8 0 The state made no effort, much less
the good faith effort required by Karcher, to achieve equality, and
the appellants argue that absolute equality was achievable because the state already had a constitutionally legitimate plan in
effect until 2010.181 The state had two options to satisfy the oneperson, one-vote rule: the state could have used updated census
numbers that had been collected with substantial technical precision,182 or the state could have demonstrated that the deviations

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1964).
173. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 746.
174. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 488 n.2.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583 (stating that the equal population rule is not
intended to require "daily, monthly, annual, or biennial" redistricting).
177. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531
(1969)).
178. See Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 18, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, No. 05-204 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2006).
179. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 19.
180. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730, (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531).
181. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 19; see also 13 U.S.C. §
196 (2000).
182. See id. at 18-19.
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from the equality requirement were for a legitimate goal. 8 3 These
limitations effectively prevent a state from using outdated num184
bers without offering a reason or justification for their use. The
appellants in Travis County argued that the use of the 2000 census is not a constitutional defense to the strict one-person, onevote requirement and to allow the state to apply the inter-censal
be a perversion of the very
legal fiction in this manner "would
185
reason the fiction was created."
The state defended its use of the outdated numbers, arguing
that under the inter-censal legal fiction, the 2000 census numbers
were still valid.8 6 Additionally, the Travis County appellants did
not provide an alternative district map based upon the current
population data that would satisfy Karcher.'87 Arguing that a limited time frame prevented such a study from being done,188 they
relied upon the 2001 map as being a constitutionally sufficient
map under the Karcher standards rather than providing an updated map.8 9 The federal government, however, provides a middecade census mechanism for state governments under 13 U.S.C.
§ 196.19° This statute allows for states to commission the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a mid-decade census, and the results
of that census will be designated as "Official Census Statistics"
" ' This proand used in "the manner provided by applicable law."19
vides the State of Texas with the ability to obtain accurate population data from an official census conducted by the Census Bureau, and that information can be used to create a new, accurate
congressional district map; the state is not forced to rely upon
state population figures. The Texas legislature, therefore, had the
opportunity and ability to create an accurate mid-decade district
map in compliance with Karcher.

183. See id. at 19.
184. See Jurisdictional Statement at 15, Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, No. 05-254 (U.S.
Aug. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Travis County Jurisdictional Statement].
185. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 13.
186. See State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 58-60.
187. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 18 & n.18 (arguing that
there was no time to commission a statewide census because of the limited two-month,
time frame between the passage of Plan 1374C and the candidate file period for congressional seats).
188. See id. at 18-19 & n.18.
189. See State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 58.
190. 13 U.S.C. § 196 (2000).
191. Id. The Secretary of Commerce conducts a mid-decade census but that data cannot
be used for redistricting purposes. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(d), (e)(2) (2000).
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The appellants maintain that permitting the state to use the
legal fiction to uphold a factually malapportioned plan diminishes
the goal of the one-person, one-vote requirement. 192 As argued in
their jurisdictional statement,
It is one thing to indulge a legal fiction such as the one in question
here when it is necessary to force legislative action, while still giving
a solid reference point to meet the constitutional rule and minimize
partisan manipulation. It is quite another thing to indulge the fiction
to permit legislative action to meet the constitutional rule
193 when the
overweening aim of the action is partisan manipulation.

The one-person, one-vote requirement is a check upon a redistricting plan to limit partisan motivations. 194 To permit a state
legislature, when creating a district map, to use inaccurate census numbers allows the state legislature to bypass the oneperson, one-vote requirement. 95 State legislatures could ignore
significant population shifts that might be detrimental to their
political party.'9 6
This legal fiction is further perverted by the state's use of the
2002 election results and its political trends together with the
outdated census data. The state used the 2002 election results to
spot political trends and to redraw the district lines in 2003.19'
District 23 provides the best example of this inconsistency. Based
upon the election results of the 2002 election in which Representative Bonilla won a close race and only garnered eight percent of
the Latino vote in the majority-Latino district, the mapmakers
decided to redraw the district, using the 2000 census numbers,
and remove a significant portion of the Latino community to ensure his re-election.' 9 Although it is understood that election
trends from previous elections may be used in the redrawing of a
decennial congressional district map, those election trends are as
up-to-date as the decennial census numbers being used. For example, when a state redraws its map after the 2000 election, it is

192. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 13.
193. Travis County Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 184, at 17.
194.

See id. at 10.

195. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 18-19.
196. See Brief for Appellants, at 30, GI Forum of Tex. v. Perry, No. 05-439 (U.S. Jan.
10, 2006) (examining the population shifts of Latinos in Texas and how the Texas Legislature manipulated the districts in Plan 1374C to dilute their voting strength).
197. See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 9.
198. See id. at 8-9; Jackson Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 127, app. at 119a.
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conceivable that the state would use the information from that
election as well as the information from the 2000 census to draw
the map. The Travis County appellants argue in their jurisdictional statement,
When new lines are drawn after the census but before the first election following it, all the many factors impinging on where lines
should be drawn-equal population, avoiding racial gerrymanders,
Voting Rights Act requirements, and above all, politics-must be
there is an interlocking
considered at the same time.... In this way,
199
web of checks on unbridled partisanship.

Allowing a state to use outdated census data but current political
trend information from a recent election undermines the intent of
the one-person, one vote requirement.
B. Pure PartisanMotivation
The Supreme Court in Vieth struggled with a case of partisan
gerrymandering in Pennsylvania that occurred when there was a
need for a new district map after the 2000 census.200 The state of
Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats and had to reapportion
the districts to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement.2 0 1 Although partisan motivations played a significant role
in how the districts were carved up,20 2 the new map served a legitimate government purpose: to ensure that the districts adhered to the strict one-person, one-vote requirement in Article I,
Section 2. This is not true in Texas, where the mid-decade redistricting map served no purpose other than partisan manipulation.
While the State argues other factors were considered in creating
the 2003 map, the underlying motivation was to increase the
number of Republican congressional districts within the state.2 3

199. Travis County Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 184, at 18-19 (internal citation omitted).
200. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-72 (2004) (plurality opinion).
201. See id. at 272 (plurality opinion).
202. See id. (plurality opinion).
203. See State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 28-29, 107-09 (arguing that while the
state legislature decided to create a new district map to diminish the power of the Democratic Party in Texas, the state legislature, when creating the map, considered factors such
as physical geography, concerns by representatives, and municipal boundaries); see also
Brief of Appellees Tina Beakiser, Chairman, Republican Party of Tex., and John DeNoyelles, at 23, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, No. 05-204 (U.S. Feb. 1,
2006).
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Much of the Court's struggle in Vieth rose from the complication
of the constitutional requirement that Pennsylvania needed a
new congressional district map. The Texas Redistricting Cases
lack that additional factor and present the Court with a unique
situation in which a state, with a valid, constitutionally-sufficient
district map in place, decided to create a new map solely to bolster partisan control over the state.
The district court, in deciding the Texas Redistricting Cases,
interpreted Vieth as rejecting the argument that proof of political
motivations as the sole reason behind the new map is insufficient
to invalidate a district or district map.2 °4 The complaint in Vieth
alleged that some of the district lines drawn in Pennsylvania
were the result of pure partisan motivation in their argument before the Supreme Court, however, appellants advocated for that
map to be invalidated because it was drawn with a predominantly
partisan intent that would create a Republican bias in future
elections. 20 5 The test proposed by appellants in Vieth would determine unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering based upon
whether "'the mapmakers acted with a predominant intent to
achieve partisan advantage.' 2 6 The plurality, joined by Justice
Kennedy, rejected this test based upon predominant intent, because it would be too difficult for a court to effectively execute.20 7
Vieth did not offer any clear guidance for a map drawn solely for
political reasons that does not serve any legitimate government
purpose.2 °8
The Equal Protection Clause, under the rational-basis standard, prohibits government use of power "solely to augment the
influence of those with a favored political agenda at the expense
of those who disagree with them."20 9 The Supreme Court has consistently held that "'the concept of equal justice under the law requires the State to govern impartially' and has forbid states from
"'draw[ing] distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.' 210 In his concurring opinion in Vieth, Justice Kennedy re-

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 25.
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272-73, 284 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 284 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 287-88.
See id. at 284-90 (plurality opinion), 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Brief for Jackson Appellants, supra note 12, at 18 n.17.
Id. at 18 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983)).
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turned to the equal protection rationale stated in Baker v. Carr:
"'Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine ... that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."' 2 1 It is understandable that Justice Kennedy found
no equal protection violation in Vieth because under the rationalbasis standard, the district map was not solely arbitrary and capricious because it served the legitimate function of reapportioning the malapportioned districts. Under the equal protection rational-basis standard, however, Plan 1374C is arbitrary and
capricious because it reflects no policy or legitimate governmental
purpose, only partisan motivations.
The Supreme Court can nullify Plan 1374C under the Equal
Protection Clause in Jackson v. Perry without detracting from its
holding that decennial census maps drawn with partisan motivations are not invalid. The concern expressed in Vieth about the
lack of a judicially manageable standard is valid, but the Texas
Redistricting Cases are limited to mid-decade redistricting for the
sole purpose of partisan manipulation when a constitutionally legitimate map is in place. These cases may be the starting point
for developing a judicially manageable standard under the Equal
Protection Clause for treating partisan gerrymandering by preventing states from redistricting mid-decade purely for partisan
gain.
States should be prevented from creating new districting maps
mid-decade when they have a legal plan in place and their only
goal and intent is partisan. District maps that are created as a
result of the decennial census would not be affected by this ruling, and preventing mid-decade redistricting would not create a
flood of partisan gerrymandering cases for courts to adjudicate.
The new standard would be a bright-line rule for lower courts to
follow, simply having to ask two questions: (1) was there already
a constitutionally valid district map in place, and if so, (2) is there
some legitimate, governmental purpose other than partisan motivation for the creation of this mid-decade plan? If the answer is
no to the second question, the district map should be nullified.

211. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 226 (1962)).
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It may be difficult in future cases to determine whether the
motivation behind the map was "solely partisan," and without a
clear standard, courts would be forced to determine the legislative
intent behind the redistricting process. The appellants did not offer a new test for courts to utilize in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering and instead relied upon the idea of pure partisan intent.21 2 Without a clear understanding of what constitutes a
legitimate government purpose, what constitutes partisan motivation beyond the situation in Texas, and how to evaluate the two
concepts, the federal courts will be no better off than before when
it comes to adjudicating partisan gerrymandering. The partisan
gerrymandering may seem unfair, but as Justice Scalia noted in
Vieth, fairness is not a judicially manageable standard.2 13
C. PublicPolicy Concerns
There are serious policy concerns if the Court fails to limit certain types of partisan gerrymandering. In Vieth, Justice Kennedy
noted that "one has the sense that legislative restraint was abandoned."2 14 In the redistricting in Texas, however, it is clear that
legislative restraint was abandoned, and if the Court approves of
the actions of the Texas legislature, all legislative restraint may
be abandoned in the future when states have to create new district maps. States would create maps after the decennial census,
and, if unsatisfied with their political gain, they would be able to
redistrict to improve their chances in the next election. Middecade redistricting would also occur every time a new political
party secures majority power in a state and wants to retain that
power as long as possible. Representatives and Senators would no
longer be beholden to their constituents, but rather to their political parties to ensure their re-election. The most noticeable example of this situation occurred in District 23 when Representative
Bonilla had a tight race in 2002.215 To ensure his re-election, the
state manipulated the district, removing 100,000 Latino voters
and replacing them with Republican voters.2 16 When a representative starts losing support in his district, he will turn to his po-

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 36.
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Brief for Travis County Appellants, supra note 12, at 8.
See id. at 8-9.
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litical party to assist him in getting re-elected, rather than listening to the voice of the people who originally elected him.
There is also the risk of voting dilution where the weight of the
voter who votes for the majority party has more stability and
power than the voter who votes against the majority party. If voters in a district start to become disenchanted with their elected
representative, the state, in an effort to ensure the incumbent's
re-election, can shift the voters around to cure this problem. The
votes of an electorate suddenly take on different weight, with
those voting for the incumbent suddenly becoming more powerful
than those voting against the incumbent.
In a nation where voter disenfranchisement is a growing concern and forty percent of the voting electorate failed to turn out
for the 2004 presidential election,2 1 v judicial support of middecade partisan redistricting would do little to cure that dilemma.
This problem will only increase once voters realize that voting
against the majority party's power is futile because the state will
simply reapportion the population to suit the majority party's
needs. A Supreme Court ruling condoning this type of behavior
cripples the democratic process and pushes partisan concerns
above those of the electorate.
There are also serious implications if the Court finds that middecade redistricting for partisan gain is unconstitutional. States
could be trapped within a constitutionally legitimate but politically unfair district map for ten years without any recourse. In a
situation such as the Texas Redistricting Cases, where the 2001
map was created by the judiciary and not by the state legislatures, states would be prevented from curing any possible defects
for ten years. The Constitution clearly makes congressional districting the province of the state legislatures,2 18 and the judiciary
only receives the task in extreme situations such as in Texas,

217. See United States Election Project, Voter Turnout, 2004 Election Data,
http://elections.gmu.edu/voterturnout.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
218. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 261 (2003)
("'[Redistricting] is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature...
.'"); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) ("[T]he Constitution leaves with the
States primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts."); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973) ("[Sltate legislatures have 'primary jurisdiction' over legislative reapportionment."); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67
(1932) (evaluating redistricting power through Article I, Section 4); State ex rel. Davis v.
Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916).
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when the legislature fails to update their congressional map.
When federal courts create district maps, they are performing the
duty of the state legislature, and the results may not always coin2 19
cide with the legislature's goals, partisan or not. It is always
dangerous when a political branch ventures into another's territory, and failing to provide the state legislatures with a remedy
from that intrusion could be perilous. If a state legislature does
not have the ability to change a district map created by a court
until the end of the decade, then that distorts the intent of the
Framers in enacting Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION

The struggle in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases is
°
most palpable in the Court's decisions in Bandemer and Vieth.
Finding a judicially manageable standard for courts to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering cases is a daunting task that many
think is not possible,22 1 and there is ample evidence to support
that claim.22 2 The Court, however, has yet to decide clearly that
partisan gerrymandering claims fall within the political question
doctrine and are, therefore, nonjusticiable. Recognizing the problems in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases, Justice
Kennedy "would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if
some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases."223
The Texas Redistricting Cases might be one situation in which
judicial relief is possible, particularly because of its limited effect
on partisan gerrymandering.
Granting judicial relief in the partisan claims brought forth by
appellants in the Texas Redistricting Cases would create a definitive line separating blatant and flagrant partisan gerrymandering that serves no legitimate governmental purpose from partisan
gerrymandering that is intertwined with a legitimate governmen-

219.

See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1982) (quoting White, 412 U.S. at 794-

95).
220. See supra Part II.B.
221. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Lacking Uudicially manageable standards], we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable....").
222. See supra Part II.B.2.
223. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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tal purpose. Failing to provide judicial relief to the partisan
claims would permit egregious partisan manipulation of district
lines and further alienate voters from their representatives. It is
precisely the narrow circumstances of this case that show that
partisan gerrymandering claims can be adjudicated, albeit only in
certain, confined circumstances. But these cases may not necessarily provide a workable solution for the future and only solve
the case at hand. The lack of a workable test to adjudicate future
partisan gerrymandering could leave the Court with the only option of finding partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable. If the
Court were to simply dismiss the claim as they did in Vieth, it
would effectively render partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable,
and it is unlikely that the Court would entertain future cases involving partisan gerrymandering.
Redistricting will always be influenced by politics, but it should
not be allowed to be totally controlled by them. As Justice Breyer
stated in his dissenting opinion in Vieth,
The use of purely political considerations in drawing district boundaries is not a "necessary evil" that, for lack of judicially manageable
standards, the Constitution inevitably must tolerate. Rather, pure
politics often helps to secure constitutionally important democratic
objectives. But sometimes it does not. Sometimes purely political
"gerrymandering" will fail to advance any plausible democratic
ob224
jective while simultaneously threatening serious democratic harm.

Democracy is founded upon the belief that the people should
elect their representatives. In a country so large and complicated,
the election process subsequently becomes complicated. While political parties dominate elections, they do serve valuable purposes, and politics should be a factor to consider when drawing
district maps. Politics, however, should not control that process.
The fear that the people will lose power to the political parties is
palpable in this day and age; the issue the Supreme Court needs
to decide is whether the courts should police politics or leave it to
the legislatures.
Whitney M. Eaton

224.

Id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

